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REGULATION OF Bus1NEss-BmaNG AND THEATER Now WITHIN ScoPE 
OF THE SHERMAN AcT-The United States instituted two civil antitrust 
actions under section 4 of the Sherman Act1 claiming that defendants 
were acting in restraint of trade in their respective fields. Defendant 
Shubert was engaged in the multistate business of producing, booking, 
and presenting legitimate theatrical attractions. Defendant International 
Boxing Club was engaged in the business of promoting professional box-
ing contests, also on a multistate basis, with an alleged 25 percent of its 
revenue being derived from the interstate sale of radio, television, and 
motion picture rights. The district court dismissed both complaints on 
126 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §4. 
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the authority of Federal Baseball Club v. National League2 and Toolson v. 
New York Yankees, lnc.,3 which had held that the business of professional 
baseball was not interstate trade or commerce within sections I and 2 of 
the Sherman Act.4 On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed, 
with two justices dissenting in the I.B.C. case. Both activities constitute 
interstate trade or commerce under the Sherman Act. The baseball cases 
apply only to that sport and afford no basis for a conclusion that all 
businesses built around live performances of local exhibitions are exempt 
from the antitrust laws. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 75 S.Ct. 
277 (1955); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 75 
S.Ct. 259 (1955). 
To prosecute a federal antitrust action successfully under the Sherman 
Act, the complainant must show the violation to be "in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several states."5 Although the Federal Baseball 
decision narrowly construed the scope of these requirements, trade or 
commerce is not limited to the exchange or production of commodities,6 
but includes businesses providing only services.7 In addition, the activity 
will be within the scope of the act if it is an inseparable part of a con-' 
tinuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states8 or has 
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.9 In the Shubert 
case the integration of producing, booking, and presenting stage produc-
tions across the nation clearly meets the jurisdictional requirements of the 
Sherman Act.10 Despite defendant's claim that the baseball cases were 
decisive authority, the Court decided that in light of earlier theatrical 
cases11 and in the absence of unique factors present in the Toolson case, 
the theater business should not come within the exemption granted to 
baseball. 
2 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465 (1922). 
3 346 U.S. 356, 74 S.Ct. 78 (1953). 
4 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1 and 2. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465 (1922); Apex 
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940). Eckler, "Baseball-Sport or Com-
merce," 17 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 56 (1949). 
7 United States v. National Assn. of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 70 S.Ct. 711 
(1950); American Medical Assn. v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 63 S. Ct. 326 (1943); 
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 65 S.Ct. 254 (1944). 
s Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 25 S.Ct. 276 (1905); United 
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162 (1944). 
9 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942); Mandeville Island Farms 
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 68 S.Ct. 996 (1948). 
10 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948). 
11 In Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271, 43 S.Ct. 540 (1923), 
a conspiracy to control the booking and presentation of vaudeville acts was alleged. 
The same court that decided the Federal Baseball case held that the incidental inter-
state aspects of any activity may become of sufficient magnitude to place it within the 
Sherman Act. See also Ring v. Spina, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 647, mod. (2d Cir. 
1951) 186 F. (2d) 637, cert. den. 341 U.S. 935, 71 S.Ct. 854 (1951) (theater productions 
within the Sherman Act). In San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. 
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In the I.B.C. case the Court did not hold that boxing itself was 
interstate trade. But the promotional undertakings of the defendant, 
especially the large percentage of gross receipts it derived from the sale 
of radio, television, and motion picture rights, did serve to bring it within 
the scope of the Sherman Act.12 Though by analogy to the baseball cases, 
it would seem that boxing should also be exempt, the Court refused to 
extend the exemption since (1) there had been no previous case specifically 
exempting boxing;13 (2) boxing, unlike baseball, had not built up a vast 
organization in reliance on the Federal Baseball decision;14 (3) there was 
an apparent desire by Congress to immunize certain aspects of baseball 
from the Sherman Act, but a contrary expression as to the promotional 
aspects of organized sports,15 with the final legal distinction between base-
ball and other sports being left to the courts.16 The Toolson case was con-
cerned only with the "reserve clause" system, which is admittedly necessary 
for the preservation of organized baseball and other team sports.17 Thus, 
the I.B.C. case presented the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to 
pass on restraints in a non-team sport as well as the promotional features 
of organized athletics.18 While team sports, depending upon limited 
league competition, have a need for a monopoly of player talent, non-
team sports such as boxing do not have this need and can be promoted 
equally well on an independent competitive basis.19 In light of Congress' 
recommendations and the I.B.C. holding, it is probable that promotional 
restraints of any sport, including baseball, will be subject to the Sherman 
Act even though the language of the baseball cases is sufficiently broad to 
exclude all of its activities. 
(2d) 310, Ring v. Spina, supra, was distinguished and an individual performer was held 
not to be within interstate commerce. 
12 This conclusion approves recent lower court decisions holding that the sale 
of such rights is sufficient to place a sport within the antitrust laws. In Gardella v. 
Chandler, (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 402, the district court's dismissal was reversed 
on the theory that the sale of radio and television rights may bring baseball within 
the Sherman Act. Subsequently, at the request of the Justice Department, baseball 
rescinded its restrictive agreements in this area. H. Hearing on H.R. 2002, 82d Cong., 
1st sess., part VI, pp. 1177-1179 (1951). In United States v. National Football League, 
(D.C. Pa. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 319, football's restrictions on the sale of radio and tele-
vision rights were considered within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. See 21 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 466 (1953). 
13 Shall v. Henry, (7th Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 226, which did exempt boxing, was 
decided after the district court's dismissal of the IBC case. 
14 But see United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., note 9 supra; Neville, 
"Baseball and the Antitrust Laws," 16 FORDHAM L. REv. 208 (1947); REPORT OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITIEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-TRusr LAws 62-63 (1955). 
15 H. Rep. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 230 (1952). 
16 Id. at pp. 134-136, 231-232. 
17 Id. at p. 228. See also 53 CoL. L. REv. 242 (1953). 
18 Although the Court in the principal cases limited the Toolson case to baseball, 
it is likely that the lower courts will use its authority to immunize the reserve clause 
agreements of other professional. team sports. 
19 See 62 YALE L. J. 576 at 630 (1953). 
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By applying the distinction that restraints which are necessary for the 
preservation of team sports are beyond the scope of the Sherman Act, 
the courts in effect decide the merits in order to determine the issue 
of jurisdiction. A more logical alternative would be to include professional 
organized sports within interstate commerce and then determine liability 
through application of the rule of reason.20 But because of the possibility 
that some of the necessary restraints may be found to be unreasonable 
per se,21 thereby causing a breakdown of organized baseball,22 it may be 
best to maintain the status quo. It is unlikely that Congress will advocate 
a change if the Supreme Court continues its present trend of deciding the 
merits of the case at the jurisdictional stage and shielding necessary mo-
nopolistic practices in baseball and other team sports from the operations 
of the Sherman Act. 
Norman A. Zilber, S.Ed. 
20 See Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation," 50 MICH. L. REv, 1139 at 1151 
(1952), and cases cited therein. 
21 Id. at 1150. 
22 See 53 COL. L. REV. 242 (1953). 
